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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
as it expressly recognizes, but this time it is giving fair warning
that if the experiment fails, it will be free to reconsider its holding.
Failure of the prior experiments and support from only a bare
majority for this decision indicate the likelihood that Linn will soon
be severely restricted or overruled entirely.
R. WALTON MCNAIRY, JR.
Real Property-Easements-Prescriptive Acquisition in
North Carolina
It has been said that the English law of prescription is in such
an unsatisfactory condition that no mere restatement can clear up
the confusion caused by the courts and legislature.' This statement
is equally applicable to the present situation in this country. The
combination of the lost grant theory-a fiction indulged in as a
means to cope with difficulties inherent in the common law prescrip-
tive system2-and the application of adverse possession law to pre-
17 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 352 (2d ed. 1937).
2 In early England prescription was founded on the assumption that the
right claimed had been enjoyed for a period beginning before the time of
legal memory, the date of which was fixed by statute at 1189. During the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, user for such a period was conclusive, as
evidence from before the time of legal memory could be of no avail to the
owner of the land. This doctrine resulted in great hardship on the claimant,
for as time passed, proof of user for such a long period became practically
impossible. The courts remedied this situation by devising a rule that if
proof of user was established as far back as living memory could go, it
would be presumed that it existed from 1189. This also, however, failed
to provide a satisfactory prescriptive period and in the absence of statutes
pertaining to prescriptive acquisition of incorporeal rights, the courts in-
vented a presumption of user from the time of legal memory whenever user
for a period corresponding to that required by statutes of limitation could
be shown. This method also caused much difficulty, for when the statutory
period was reduced to twenty years, the presumption was often rebutted by
proof that the user originated after 1189, although it had persisted for the
twenty year period. By the eighteenth century English judges began to
think it absurd that although twenty years enjoyment sufficed for the acquisi-
tion of a corporeal right, enjoyment since 1189 had to be shown before the
claimant could acquire an easement in respect to the same corporeal body.
Thus the courts resorted to a legal fiction founded on the medieval idea
that every prescriptive title is based on a presumed grant made before the be-
ginning of legal memory. Through this fiction of the lost grant the courts
presumed from long user and exercise of right by the claimant with acquies-
cence of the owner, that there must have originally been a grant of the
right which had become lost in modern times, i.e., after 1189. By analogy
to the statute of limitations the prescriptive period was set at twenty years.
This fiction successfully fulfilled its purpose as it destroyed the effect of
proof of user beginning within the time of legal memory. It was in this
form and with this background that the lost grant doctrine was ushered
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scriptive easements has led to considerable difficulty in terms of
application and terminology. It is the purpose of this discussion to
comment on the state of prescriptive law in North Carolina with
regard to its confusing historical evolvement.
Common law rules as to the nature of user required to establish
a prescriptive right were well established. The English, borrowing
from Roman law, announced that the user must be nec vi, nec clam,
nec precario-open and as of right.' Also, as was stated by Coke, a
long, continuous, and peaceable user was necessary.4 To these basic
requirements American courts have added a number of elements by
analogy to adverse possession. Thus, today it is generally stated in
all states that to acquire an easement by prescription, the user must
be open, exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and under a
claim of right with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner for
the prescriptive period.5
The common law requirement of claim of right6 gave claimants
little probative difficulty. It was generally reasoned that a continuing
breach of the owner's possession without permission was patently
adverse to the owner. Today this reasoning is followed by the
majority of American courts in that a presumption of adverse user
is created, in the absence of other explanation, whenever it appears
that the servitude was enjoyed openly, continuously, and uninter-
ruptedly for the prescriptive period. The obvious effect of this rule
is to place upon the owner of the land the burden of overcoming the
presumption. There is, however, a widely recognized exception to
into American courts. See generally Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. MeFarlan,
43 N.J.L. 605, 617-30 (E.&A. 1881); Dalton v. Angus, 6 App. Cas. 740
(1881); HOLDSWORTH, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAW
§ 8 (1927); SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF LAND
LAW 248 (1961); 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1191 (3d ed. 1939) [here-
inafter cited as TIFFANY]; WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
§ 141 (2d ed. 1932); WALSH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW§ 75 (1924).
'HOLDSWORTH, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAw § 8,
at 282 (1927).
'Co. LITT. 113b.
'See 25 AM. JUR. 2d Easements §§ 49-63 (1966); BuRBY, REAL PROP-
ERTY § 31 (3d ed. 1965); 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 413 (1952); RE-
STATEMENT (FIVE), PROPERTY § 457 (1944); 4 TIFFANY §§ 1195-99, 1201,
1202.
' See Jacobs v. Brewster, 354 Mo. 729, 190 S.W.2d 894 (1945), to the
effect that a use is adverse when made under a claim of right.
'See Annot., 170 A.L.R. 776 (1947); 1 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY
§ 436 (1939); 4 TIFFANY § 1196A; 21 Mo. L. REv. 91 (1956); 12 Wyo.
L.J. 59 (1957).
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this general rule where the land involved is considered -to be wild,
uninclosed, or unimproved. In this situation there is generally a
presumption of permissiveness, or at least no presumption of ad-
verseness.
8
Due to the similiarity of the above elements to adverse posses-
sion law, their interpretation and application in prescriptive situa-
tions has caused no little difficulty. This is especially true when the
lost grant doctrine with its connotations of initial permissiveness is
commingled with the elements of adverse possession. In light of
this it is not surprising that the majority of states hold that pre-
scriptive acquisition of easements can be adequately supported by
direct analogy to adverse possession law and the statute of limita-
tions, thus rendering continued indulgence in the lost grant fiction
unnecessary."
As to final result, the difference between these theories is one
of degree only. Apparently there is no authority on the point, but
it seems that a greater degree of adverseness is required under the
adverse possession analogy than under the lost grant doctrine. Theo-
retically there is a notable difference. In adverse possession a statute
of limitations generally bars the right of action and it must be
pleaded as a defense by the person relying on it. Title by adverse
possession is negative in that the right vests because the owner is
prevented, by legislative enactment, to assert his title. On the other
hand, prescription under the lost grant theory confers a positive
title, by presumption of a grant, upon the person who enjoyed it for
the prescriptive period.1" Thus title by adverse possession is a crea-
ture of the legislature, whereas title acquired under the lost grant
doctrine is solely a creation of the judiciary.11
'See 25 Am. Jun. 2d Easements § 46 (1966); Annot. 1 A.L.R. 1368(1919); 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 413 (1952); 4 TIFFANY. To the
effect that "unimproved" is the most appropriate word see Annot. 170 A.L.R.
776, 820 (1947).
See 25 Am. JUR. 2d Easements § 39 (1966) (split of authority noted
and citations given); BuRnY, REAL PROPERTY § 31 (3d ed. 1965); WALSH,
A HISTORY OF ANGLo-AMERICAN LAW § 141 (2d ed. 1932).
"0 The prescriptive period is usually the same as that required under the
statute of limitations for adverse possession. This fact is at least partly
responsible for the original analogy drawn between adverse possession and
prescriptive acquisition of easements.
"' For an excellent discussion of the theoretical and practical differences
between the lost grant doctrine and the adverse possession theory; and a
strong argument for continued indulgence in the former, see Big Cotton-




The North Carolina cases concerning prescriptive acquisition of
easements are not large in number. They are, however, adequate to
provide a basis for several conclusions as to where this state stands
in the midst of the confusing myriad of fictions and presumptions.
One of the earliest North Carolina cases concerning prescrip-
tion was Wilson v. Wilson'2 in which the court found no error in
the lower court instruction that
the presumption of a grant, arising from the use of an easement
for more than twenty years and acquiescence by the owners of
the land, might be repelled by other evidence, and if the presump-
tion was not repelled, they ought to find for the defendants."
It is evident that the theoretical foundation of this case, as well as
other early cases, 4 was the lost grant doctrine. Yet the significance
of this particular decision lies in the fact that the North Carolina
court, from the very beginning, did not consider the presumption
of grant from twenty years user conclusive, but rebuttable. This
line of thought is illustrative of the difficulties often caused by ad-
herence to a fiction. The court could not have meant that the pre-
sumption of a grant was rebuttable, for as was noted above, the
"presumption was a mere fiction, no one believing in such cases
that a grant had ever been made."' 5 The anomaly is obvious in that
the court was stating that it would accept evidence to rebutt the
presumption of a grant which by definition had never existed.
Clearly all the court could have meant was that evidence would be
accepted to show that the elements on which a presumption of grant
is based did not exist.'6 The Wilson case not only illustrates the
initial difficulty encountered as to prescriptive terminology, but also
constitutes early recognition in North Carolina of the analogy drawn
by the courts between adverse possession and prescription.' 7 In the
mid-nineteenth century North Carolina cases dealing with prescrip-
tion took a turn which was ultimately to have a tremendous effect.
1 15 N.C. 154 (1833).
"Id. at 155.
"4 State v. Hunter, 27 N.C. 369 (1845); Gerenger v. Summers, 24 N.C.
229 (1842); Pugh v. Wheeler, 19 N.C. 50 (1836).
" WALSn, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW § 141, at 274 (2d ed.
1932).
" It has been said that the presumption of a lost grant cannot be viewed
as a true presumption; and since it is a fiction of the law, the courts cannot
allow a direct attack upon it. Simonton, Fictional Lost Grant iz Prescrip-
tion--A Nocuous Archaisin, 35 W. VA. L.Q. 46 (1929).
11 15 N.C. at 156.
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In 1850 the North Carolina Supreme Court in a series of cases"8
beginning with Felton v. Simpson'9 emphasized that it is essential
that the user be adverse and as of right in order to raise a presump-
tion of a grant. This assertion becomes significant only when it is
noted that it was made without any mention of an initial presump-
tion of adverseness. It seems to be a reasonable deduction from
these cases that North Carolina at this time did not presume ad-
verseness from mere user, but required it to be proved without the
aid of a presumption. The court in Ray v. Lipscomb20 sent the
question of adverseness to the jury without any instruction as to a
presumption or burden of proof. The court, in referring to the cases
mentioned above,2 announced that
these cases, as it seems to us, put the doctrine of the presumption
of a right of way from user, on its true basis; and, as was said in
the argument, considering the state of things among us for many
years past, in regard to one neighbor's passing over the unin-
closed land of another, either on foot or horseback, or with his
wagon, any other conclusion would have resulted in great incon-
venience.2
In the case of Boyden v. Achenbach 8 the court, relying on the
Ray case, stated as dictum that "there must be some evidence accom-
panying the user, giving it a hostile character and repelling the in-
ference that it is permissive and with the owner's consent."24
Earlier in this same case the court had reasoned that
it would be unreasonable to deduce from the owner's quiet acqui-
escence, a simple act of neighborhood courtesy, in the use of a
way convenient to others, and not injurious to himself, over land
unimproved or in woods, consequences so seriously detracting
from the value of the land thus used, and compel him needlessly
to interpose and prevent the enjoyment of the privilege in order
to the preservation of the right of property unimpaired.2 5
It must be noted that the court in the above cases considered the
land in question to be unimproved. Thus the application of the
1 Smith v. Bennett, 46 N.C. 372 (1854); Ingraham v. Hough, 46 N.C.
39 (1853); Mebane v. Patrick, 46 N.C. 23 (1853); Felton v. Simpson, 33
N.C. 84 (1850).1033 N.C. 84 (1850).
0 48 N.C. 185 (1855).
"1 See cases cited note 18 supra.
22 48 N.C. at 186.2 86 N.C. 397 (1882).




exception26 to the general rule of presumption of adverseness seems
to have been warranted. It is, however, most probable that the court
was unconcerned with the distinction between improved and unim-
proved land as it had applied a workable and realistic rule consistent
with its obvious preoccupation with the idea of "neighborhood
courtesy." This theory is borne out in the case of Snowden v. Bell2"
where the court relied upon the Boyden case to establish the general
rule of a permissive presumption from twenty years user in North
Carolina.28 The immediate effect of this rule was to place a burden
on the claimant to prove that the use was adverse or as of right
and not permissive.29 Thus North Carolina departs sharply from
the majority and the common law in presuming a permissive user.
The effect of this development on North Carolina prescriptive law
will be considered in the conclusion.
Practically the court saw no difficulty in continued adherence to
the lost grant doctrine in spite of the permissive presumption rule,
for in 1924, in the case of Draper v. Conner0 it was restated that
a sufficient lapse of time raises a presumption that there must
originally have been a grant from the owner to the claimant. It
is conveniently designated a 'lost grant', not because the original
is of primary importance, but to avoid the rule of pleading re-
quiring profert- 1
Thus, as late as Draper, North Carolina was still adhering to the
fiction of lost grant. This appears to be, however, the last compre-
hensive statement of lost grant theory in the North Carolina court,
although it has been briefly mentioned in a number of subsequent
cases.
32
The prescriptive litigation directly following Draper was char-
'o See note 8 supra and accompanying text.27159 N.C. 497, 75 S.E. 721 (1912).
2' See Annot. 170 A.L.R. 776, 800 (1947) for a more detailed develop-
ment of the North Carolina presumption of permissiveness. Accord, Nicholas
v. Furniture Co., 248 N.C. 462, 103 S.E.2d 837 (1958); Speight v. Ander-
son, 226 N.C. 492, 39 S.E.2d 371 (1946) ; Darr v. Aluminum Co., 215 N.C.
768, 3 S.E.2d 434 (1939) ; Perry v. White, 185 N.C. 79, 116 S.E. 84 (1923) ;
Nash v. Shute, 184 N.C. 383, 114 S.E. 470 (1922); State v. Norris, 174
N.C. 808, 93 S.E. 950 (1917).
"See McCracken v. Clark, 235 N.C. 186, 69 S.E.2d 184 (1952); State
v. Fisher, 117 N.C. 733, 23 S.E. 158 (1895).
187 N.C. 18, 121 S.E. 29 (1924).
"Id. at 20; 121 S.E. at 30.
Speight v. Anderson, 226 N.C. 492, 39 S.E.2d 371 (1946); Chesson v.
Jordan, 224 N.C. 289, 29 S.E.2d 906 (1944); Davis v. Robinson, 189 N.C.
589, 127 S.E. 697 (1925).
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acterized by continued use of the permissive presumption and re-
liance on the philosophy that "the law should, and does encourage
acts of neighborly courtesy. ' 33 This philosophy is not by any means
unique to North Carolina as most courts will apply it where the
facts warrant.34 Yet it appears that in North Carolina it is relied
upon even in situations where its application is most questionable.
In Weaver v. Pitts"5 the evidence showed that the plaintiff and those
under whom they claimed had used a private way over the defen-
dant's land for more than fifty years. At one point during the use
the defendant owner obstructed the road for a few hours, but
plaintiff cleared the obstruction and continued the use. At another
time the defendant felled a large tree across the road whereupon
the plaintiff asked him if he was willing for the road to be opened,
stating that if he were not, an action would be brought at once.
The owner agreed and plaintiff removed the obstruction. From
these facts it would seem that a finding of adverseness or claim of
right would be warranted. It was.held, however, that the evidence
tended to show a permissive use and that "it is only when the use of
the path or road is clearly adverse to the owner of the land, and
not an enjoyment of neighborly courtesy, that the land owner is
called upon 'to go to law' to protect his rights." 6 It is immaterial
whether the court considered the land to be unimproved or not, for
the plaintiff made it evident by his threat to institute an action that
he recognized no right in the defendent to stop the user. The fact
that another means of ingress and egress had recently been afforded
the plaintiff may have influenced the court's decision. In any event
it may be said that there is little similarity between the facts stated
above and facts showing a merely casual use of a neighbors way,17
yet the same standards are applied in both situations.38 Five years
later in Chesson v. Jordan9 it was again stated that prescription is
founded on the fiction of lost grant. However, the court warned
that ". . . the law will not assume, in the absence of proof, that the
"Weaver v. Pitts, 191 N.C. 747, 749, 133 S.E. 2, 3 (1926).
"4 TIFFANY § 1196A.
"191 N.C. 747, 133 S.E. 2 (1926).
"Id. at 749, 133 S.E. at 3.
', Ray v. Lipscomb, 48 N.C. 185 (1855).
8 See Darr v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 215 N.C. 768, 3 S.E.2d 434
(1939) where subjection of land to the use of a ditch for seventy years did
not result in an easement for the claimant. The court held that the permis-
sive presumption was not rebutted.
"224 N.C. 289, 29 S.E.2d 906 (1944).
[Vol 45
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owner ... made a grant .. that substantially limits the use of his
property .... "40 The language of the court is indicative of its reluc-
tance to grant a prescriptive easement. More significant, however,
is its statement in the same case that "the nature of the easement
acquired rather than the character of the use must control the rights
of the parties."4 A logical interpretation of this general statement
results in the conclusion that it is the type or extent of the easement
claimed that is the overriding consideration, not whether the ele-
ments of prescription are proved. The latter, however, are most cer-
tainly necessary. Thus there seem to be strong policy considerations
woven into the court's preoccupation with the "nature of the ease-
ment" that result in an extremely strict interpretation of a prescrip-
tive situation. This interpretation is seen most clearly in Henry v.
Farlow42 where the plaintiff had, without asking or receiving per-
mission, openly and continuously used a way over the defendant's
land for twenty-five years-a situation most indicative of a claim
of right. The court reemphasized that the "law presumes that the
use of a way over another's land is permissive or with consent unless
the contrary appears."4 It continued by rationalizing that the "cir-
cumstance that the owners did not object to the use of the way
harmonizes with the theory that they permitted the use of the
way."4 4 Here the court fails to recognize any distinction between
"permission" and "acquiescence." 45 As was seen above46 it is gen-
erally held that acquiescence of the owner is a necessary element in
prescription no matter which theory is followed. In fact, it has
been stated that permission is evidence that a claimant does not have
an easement by prescription, whereas acquiescence is evidence that
he does. 7 Apparently the requirement of acquiescence developed
under the lost grant thecry, it being reasoned that if the owned did
,
0 d. at 292, 29 S.E.2d at-909.
,Id: at 293, 29 S.E.2d at 909.
' 238 N.C. 542, 78 S.E.2d 244 (1953).
43 Id. at 544, 78 S.E.2d at 245; Note that the court no. longer mentions
"unimptoved" land when stating this rule.
4Id. at 544, 78 S.E.2d at 245:
Acquiescence commonly means passive assent, quiescence, or consent
by silence; while permission denotes permission in fact, express or by neces-
sary implication. 25 Am. JTJR. 2d Easements § 61 (1966).
46 See note 5 supra and accompanying text. To the effect that North
Carolina requires acquiescence, see Gruber v. Eubank, 197 N.C. 280, 148
S.E. 246 (1929); Wilson v. Wilson, 15 N.C. 154 (1833).
' Naporra v. Weckwerth, 178 Minn. 203, 226 N.W. 569 (1929); 4
TI1PFANY § 1191.
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not object, there must have originally been a grant.4" Yet the North
Carolina court in the above case uses the very same reasoning to
reach the opposite result that acquiescence is evidence, not of a grant,
but of permission. The court may have reasoned that the acts of
the defendant did not constitute acquiescence, yet if this is true, it
is difficult to conceive of any situation in which a party would be
held to have acquiesed. Most probably the court simply rejected
quiet acquiescence 9 as indicative of the prescriptive acquisition of
an easement. This would seem to indicate that a verbal or active
acquiescence is a necessary element in North Carolina. If this is
correct, the claimant's burden will be even more difficult, as there
is an even finer line between this type acquiescence and actual per-
mission.
The logical opposite of the conclusion reached in the Henry
case would seem to be that an objection by the owner would be
evidence of adverseness. Unfortunately Ingraham v. Hough" has
been cited8" as stating the proposition that a mere verbal protest is
sufficient to interrupt the user and thus prevent the right from vest-
ing. The dilemma is obvious. Seemingly if the owner objects to
the use, there is an interruption and the claimant is denied an ease-
ment; yet if the owner is silent, it is evidence of permissiveness and
the claimant is again denied an easement. The court in the Henry
case must have noticed these difficulties, yet it defended its position
by announcing that there was
no inconsistency between the circumstance that the plaintiff and
her tenants used the way without asking the owners of the soil
for permission to do so, and the conclusion that the plaintiff and
her tenants used the way with the implied consent of the owners
of the soil. When all is said, the assertion that the plaintiff and
her tenants used the way without asking the permission of the
" See Mebane v. Patrick, 46 N.C. 23 (1853) where the court stated that
it is the fact of his [the claimant] being thus exposed to an action,
and the neglect of the opposite party to bring suit, that is seized upon
as the ground for presuming a grant... upon the idea that this ad-
verse state of things would not have been submitted to if there had not
been a grant.
Id. at 25. (Emphasis added.)
" There is some indication of a distinction between "quiet" acquiescence
and acquiescence even in early cases. See Weaver v. Pitts, 191 N.C. 747,
133 S.E. 2 (1926); State v. Norris, 174 N.C. 808, 93 S.E. 950 (1917);
Boyden v. Achenbach, 86 N.C. 397 (1882).
"46 N.C. 39 (1853).
"Annot. 5 A.L.R. 1325 (1920).
[Vol. 45
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owners of the soil is tantamount to the assertion that the plaintiff
and her tenants used the way in silence. Neither law nor logic
can confer upon a silent use a greater probative value than in-
herent in a mere use?"
This holding in itself may be consistent, but in order to find this
consistency it is necessary to wipe out the substantial body of case
law that precedes it.
This leads one to ask what a claimant must do in North Caro-
line to acquire an easement by prescription. Some help may be
found in the 1966 case of Dulin v. Faires' where the defendants
had used the way in question for the prescriptive period of twenty
years. In addition the defendants worked and maintained the road
throughout the period and used it as an entrance to a business enter-
prise situated on their land. When the defendants requested that
the plaintiff aid in the maintenance of the road, the plaintiff an-
swered: "the road belongs to you; you keep it up."" The court
held that the evidence, considered in a light most favorable to the
defendants "was sufficient to permit, although not compel, a jury
finding that such use was adverse and under claim of right."55 The
statement of the plaintiff and the fact that the defendants main-
tained the road seem strongly to suggest a recognition by the plain-
tiff that the defendants were acting under a claim of right. In
addition it could certainly be reasoned that there was verbal or
active acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff. This case then is
perhaps indicative of the nature of the user as well as the nature of
the easement necessary in a North Carolina prescription case.
The difficulties encountered in the foregoing discussion have re-
sulted from an attempt over the years to retain the lost grant doc-
trine, in part if not in whole, while at the same time analogizing
prescription to adverse possession. In addition, the attempted re-
conciliation of both theories with modern policy considerations has
added to the confusion. In order to adequately understand the
terminology, the presumptions, and the rules of prescription, the
North Carolina lawyer is compelled to delve deeply into history.
It has been seen how the term "acquiescence" has taken on extra-
ordinary legal meanings over the years, with the result that today it
" Henry v. Farlow, 238 N.C. 542, 544, 78 S.E.2d 244, 245 (1953).
'266 N.C. 257, 145 S.E.2d 873 (1966).
" Id. at 262, 145 S.E.2d at 877.
Id. at 263, 145 S.E.2d at 877.
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is difficult to determine how the courts will define it. Many jurisdic-
tions have completely dropped the lost grant fiction and now apply
adverse possession law by direct analogy. Yet it must be remem-
bered that the law of adverse possession was designed to deal pri-
marily with corporeal bodies, and its application to incorporeal
interests is not entirely satisfactory."6 Thus under either theory the
court is faced with overly complicated situations.
As has been seen, North Carolina requires strong evidence of
adverseness, and this fact along with the usual presumption of per-
missiveness seem to indicate that North Carolina tends toward a
direct analogy with adverse possession law.57 In addition, the hold-
ing of the court in Henry is, theoretically at least, in direct conflict
with the lost grant doctrine as acquiescence is no longer conducive to
the presumption of a grant, but to permissiveness. Yet, as was noted
in the discussion, North Carolina would probably hold on the author-
ity of an early case 8 that a mere verbal protest interrupts the user.
If true, this would have to be based on a lost grant theory as such
protest would be sufficient to overcome the presumption of a grant,
but without the aid of an actual obstruction" would be insufficient
on the adverse possession theory. In general then, it may be said
that North Carolina relies on elements of both theories, but leans
heavily toward a direct analogy with adverse possession. This ten-
dency is in large part due to the fact that under modern notions of
neighborliness, prescriptive rights are generally not favored in the
law as they necessarily result in the forfeiture of the rights of others.
" See Annot., 170 A.L.R. 776 (1947) where it was stated:
there is little similarity between adverse possession and prescriptive
use. To say that the possession must be continuous, then explain that
it need not be continuous if it is availed of as needed; to say that
the use must be uninterrupted, then declare (as some courts have
declared) that it is interrupted if it is merely protested against; to say
that it must be with the knowledge of the owner, then explain that
it need not be with his actual knowledge if it is open and visible; to
say that it must be with -his 'acquiescence, then admit that if he tries
to stop it, and the party persists in. it, the claim of prescriptive right
is strengthened rather than annulled; to declare that the use must be
exclusive, then, explain that it need not really be exclusive if it is in
the party's own right-all these attempts at measurement by the
terms of adverse possession causes needless discussion.
Id. at 778.
" See 32 N.C.L. REv. 379, 484 (1954) where it is also recognized that
the permissive presumption brings North Carolina closer to the adverse
possession theory.
" Ingraham v. Hough, 46 N.C. 39 (1853).
" Annot., 5 A.L.R. 1325 (1920).
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The courts in North Carolina have been so jealous of such a claim
that it is doubtful whether a degree of adverseness, sufficient in an
adverse possession situation, would stand up in a prescription case.
In any event it is quite clear that the claimant of a prescriptive ease-
ment in North Carolina today has a tremendous burden to overcome.
JOHN G. ALDRIDGE
Real Property-Landlord and Tenant-Lessee's Liability
For Sublessee's Negligence
In Dixie Fire & Cas. Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,1 the fire
insurer of a landlord sued insured's lessee, Esso, for injuries done
the demised premises by a fire allegedly caused by the negligence of
Esso's sublessee. In the trial court, plaintiff had been ordered to
elect tort or contract and had proceeded on a negligence theory, al-
though the original complaint had been based upon a convenant of
the lease.2 The Superior Court sustained defendant's demurrer and
plaintiff apealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a lessee
is liable in tort for waste resulting from the negligence of a sub-
lessee, thereby expanding the basis of liability of the tenant for in-
juries to the demised premises.
At one time, the liability of the tenant was almost absolute,
making him virtually the insurer of his landlord, liable for waste
upon injury to or destruction of the premises, even if the injury
was the result of unavoidable accident or the act of a stranger.4
Like most states, North Carolina reduced this liability by a statute
providing that the "tenant ... shall not be liable for damage occur-
ring on the demised premises accidentally, and notwithstanding rea-
sonable diligence on his part, unless he so contract."5 While the
1265 N.C. 121, 143 S.E.2d 279 (1965).
2 The reasons for plaintiff's choice are beyond the scope of this note.
For discussion, of the tort-contract borderline, see PROSSER, TORTS §§ 93-95
(3d ed. 1964).
'Although the action of waste originally lay only against a guardian in
chivalry, tenant in dower, or tenant by curtesy, the Statute of Marlborough,
1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 23, created an action against all tenants for life or years.
" 1 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY 158 (5th ed. 1887). The tenant's liabil-
ity was compared to that of a common carrier in that "both are charged with
the protection of property intrusted to them, against all but the acts of God
and the king's enemies. . . ." Attersol v. Stevens, 1 Taunt. 183, 198, 127
Eng. Rep. 802, 808 (C.P. 1808).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-10 (1950).
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